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THE past fifty years have seen a tremendous rise in international litigation. There are 
more parties who are more prone to use international law mechanisms to resolve 
their disputes, and more international actors have more fo rums available to them 
to which they can bring their disputes. Indeed, the multifaceted growth of interna-
tional dispute resolution is one of international law's most important and interest-
ing recent developments. 
At the heart of this development are international adjudicative bodies, a diverse 
group of international bodies that have a common dispute settlement function, 
the outcome of which is binding on the parties. This chapter examines how, when, 
and over whom these bodies can exercise their function, as well as the nature and 
enforceability of their decisions. 1 
' For an introduction to the issue, see Chiara Giorgetti (ed.), 'Jh e Hu les, Practice, and jurisprudence 
of Tnternational Courts and "Ji-ilnmals (Leiden: Martinus Nij hoff, 2012); Ruth Mackenzie et al., '!he 
Manual on international Courts and 'tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); and Cesare 
Romano, "' I he Proliferation of J nternational Courts and Tribunals: the Pieces of the Puzzle;' New York 
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INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIVE BODIES: 
THE BASICS 
International adjudicative bodies include a variety of international courts and tribu-
nals, claims and compensation commissions, arbitral tribunals, and ad hoc bodies.2 
At their core and as a minimum, these bodies can issue decisions that are binding 
for the parties to which the decision is directed. The constitution of each body, 
applicable rules of procedure, the number and nomination procedure of decision -
makers, and the way in which binding decisions are reached and become enforce-
able, however, differ greatly among these bodies. 
Indeed, the types of adjudicative bodies also vary greatly in terms of their subject 
matter jurisdiction, which can be general or specific; personal jurisdiction, which 
can encompass individuals, states, international organizations, and corporations; 
and geographical and temporal jurisdictions. 
The binding nature of their decisions differentiates adjudicative bodies from 
other international organization bodies that may exercise similar review and moni-
toring functions and possess some nonadjudicative means, but whose decisions are 
ultimately not legally binding. These bodies include international review, account-
ability, oversight, and audit mechanisms; human rights treaties and United Nations 
(UN) Charter bodies; and the compliance mechanisms of several multi lateral 
environmental treaties.3 
Because they are parts of international organizations, international adjudicative 
bodies also share some of the essential characteristics of international organiza-
tions: they are international actors, which means that they are generally created by 
international law and they are bound by it, and are generally detached from domes-
tic law. Being international actors, their staff is constituted by international civil 
servants whose conditions of service are regulated by international instruments. 
Within their respective international organizations, adjudicative bodies resolve 
disputes between actors, and their decisions can result in an enforceable and man-
datory act. However, the relevance of their dispute resolution function can vary 
' As the fun ctions and structures of adjudicative bodies va ry, there is no agreed taxonomy or 
agreed definition of this group. See Cesare P. R. Romano, "A "faxonomy of Jnternational Rule of Law 
Insti tutions;' journal of lnlernal iona/ Dispute Sell/emen l 2 (2011): 241; and Cesare P.R. Romano, Karen J. 
Alter, and Yuval Shany, Oxji1rd Handbook of International Adjudicalion (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). See also the 2004 synoptic table developed by the Project on International Courts and 
Tribunals. '!he table is now out of date, but still useful and available at http://www.pict-pcti.org/publi -
cations/ syn optic_ chart/ synop _ c4. pd f, 
.i Romano explains that "All bodies in the class of Non-Adjudi cative Means share the trait of pro -
du cing outcome that are not binding. ll1ey are called ' reports' or 'recommendations' and do not cre-
ate a legal obligation on their recipients who remain free to adopt them or ignore them": Romano, 
"A 'faxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions;' L 
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substantially, from playing a core role within the organization to being in a periph-
eral, supportive position. 
Diversity of Adjudicative Bodies 
International adjudicative bodies share several common characteristics. At their core, 
they are all neutral and independent bodies that resolve disputes through binding adju-
dicative means. These bodies are "made up of independent judges who are entrusted 
with adjudicating international disputes on the basis of international law according 
to a pre-determined set of rules of procedures and rendering decisions which are 
binding on the parties:' 1 The adjudicative process may vary substantially and include 
judicial and arbitral proceedings and decisions on international claims and compensa-
tions. Eventually, the outcome of the process is always legally binding for the parties. 
Adjudicative bodies typically hear cases where at least one of the parties is a state or an 
international organization. The parties to the dispute are also ensured a certain degree 
of participation in the process by some form of oral and written submissions. 
Because of the diverse nature, structure, jurisdiction, and competence of existing 
adjudicative bodies, a shared systematization is difficult. Still, it is possible to group 
them according to several common characteristics. 
International Courts and Tribunals v. Arbitral and Other ad hoc Bodies 
First, it is possible to distinguish between judicial bodies, such as international 
courts and tribunals, and other arbitral and ad hoc bodies. Note that this difference 
is essentially descriptive, and not outcome-determinative, as all these bodies ulti-
mately issue binding decisions. 
Judicial Bodies 
The paradigmatic example of an international judicial body is the International 
Court ofJustice (ICJ), which Article 92 of the UN Charter defines as the "principle 
judicial organ" of the UN.5 
Judicial bodies include international courts and tribunals which are permanent 
institutions made up of an existing and permanent judiciary. These kinds of bodies 
are generally created before the dispute between the parties arose.6 
'' Christian 'lomuschat, "International Courts and Tribunals;' Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (online editi on, available at opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL), para. i. 
5 In general, see Sean Murphy, "cll1e International Court of Justice;' in 771e Rules, Practice, and 
jurisprudence of'International Courts and Tribunals, ed. Chiara Giorgetti (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012). 
0 See Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen J. Alter, and Yuval Shany, "Mapping International Adjudicative 
Bodies, the Issues and the Players;' in Oxford Handbook of Internat.ional Adjudication, ed. Cesare P.R. 
Romano, Karen J. Alter, and Yuval Shany (New York: Oxford University Press, 20 14), 5. 
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Judicial bodies include diverse kinds of international courts and tribunals such 
as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), International Tribunal for the Law of Sea (ITLOS), and the Administrative 
Tribunal of the International Monetary Fund. 
Arbitral Bodies and Other ad hoc Bodies 
Separate from pure judicial bodies are other kinds of dispute resolution bodies that 
can issue legally binding decisions, but do not enjoy the characteristics of judicial 
bodies as described above. Typically, these bodies are not permanent, but temporary, 
and are often created after the dispute has arisen, with the aim of deciding one 
particular issue or dispute. These bodies include international arbitration tribunals, 
international claims and compensation bodies and other ad hoc bodies whose final 
decision, regardless of whether it is issued as an award, decision or report, is ulti-
mately binding on the parties.7 
International arbitration tribunals are temporary tribunals in which the parties 
enjoy a high degree of freedom and control. Parties can choose the arbitrators who 
decide the dispute-who, once appointed, must decide independently.8 Parties are 
also generally free to decide both the substantial and procedural applicable law. 
Arbitral tribunals cease to exist once the reason for their creation is exhausted 
and the award issued. International organizations include several structures 
that facilitate the formation and work of international arbitration, including the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an autono-
mous international institution which is part of the World Bank Group established 
under the Convention on the Settlement oflnvestment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention).9 Similarly, the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration (PCA), established in 1899 to facilitate arbitration and other forms 
of dispute resolution between states, offers a permanent framework to constitute 
international arbitral tribunals to resolve many different kinds of disputes involving 
states, state entities, intergovernmental organizations, and private parties. 
Other ad hoc bodies are created by agreement of the parties after a dispute has 
arisen between them. Because of their unique genesis, their jurisdiction and rules of 
procedure vary. Important examples of ad hoc quasi-judicial bodies include several 
international claims and compensation bodies. For example, the Iran- US Claims 
Tribunal was created in 1981 to adjudicate thousands of complex commercial and 
7 See, in general, Jose E. Alvarez, "Dispute Settlement by 'Quasi-judicial' and 'Judicial' Bodies;' in 
International Organizations as Law-Makers, ed. Jose E. Alvarez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
" On the ramifications of this situation, see C. Giorgetti, "Who Decides in Tnternational Investment 
Arbitration?;' University Of Pennsylvania journal of lnternational Law 35 (2014): 43i. 
" See the very comprehensive website of the ICSTD Secretariat, at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
ICSID/Index.jsp. See also Carolyn Lamm, Chiara Giorgetti, and Main'!e Uran-Bidegain , "International 
Centre for Settlement ofinvestment Disputes:' in The Rules, Practice, and Jurisprudence of International 
Courts and Tribunals, ed. Chiara Giorgetti (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012). 
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international law claims between Iran and the United States and their nationals arising 
out of the 1979 Revolution in Iran.10 Another important ad hoc judicial body, the UN 
Compensation Commission (UNCC), was created bya UN Security Council (UNSC) 
resolution to compensate individuals, international organizations, corporations, 
and UN member states for losses resulting from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occu-
pation of Kuwait in i991. 11 Also, several important ad hoc bodies were created under 
the aegis of the PCA, including the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission and 
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Clai ms Commission-both created to resolve dispute arising 
from the Eth iopia-Eritrea 1998-2000 war. 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Second, international adjudicat ive bodies can also be usefully distinguished by 
focusing on their subj ect matte r jurisdi ction . Most of these bodies have very spe-
cific jurisdiction, whi le the competence of others is more general. 
General Jurisdiction 
The ICJ, the "principle judicial organ" of the UN, is the main example of court of 
general jurisdiction. In contentious proceedings, the court is open to states parties 
to its Statute.12 Article 36 of th e Statute specifi es that the jurisdiction of the Court 
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for 
in the UN Charter or in treaties and conventions in force. 13 States parties can also 
accept at any time compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for speci fi c legal disputes 
concerning the interpretat ion of treaties or other questions of international law.11 
The ICJ has decided cases related to territorial and maritime boundaries, rules on 
state responsibility, the immunities of states and state officials, the use of force, dip-
lomatic and consular law, and the law of the sea and environmental law. 
''' Jeremy K. Sharpe, "" lhe l ran United States Claims Tribunals;' in "lhe Rules, Practice, and 
Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribu nals, ed. Chiara Giorgetti (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2012). 
" Timothy ). Feighery, "" ll1e United Nati ons Compensation Commission ;' in Th e Rules, Practice, 
and Jurisprudence of Internat.ional Courts and 'fribun a/s, ed. Chiara Giorgetti (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2012). 
12 Note that the IC) is also entrusted with advisory jurisdiction, see "Advisory Opinions" later in 
this chapter. 
'
3 Art. 36, LC) Statute, available on the website of the IC): http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index . 
php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0. 
"' Ibid. '!his states at paras. 1 and 2 that: " i. ' ll1e jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which 
the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in 
treaties and conventions in force. 2. '1 he states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare 
that they recognize as compulsory ipso fac to and without special agreement, in relation to any other 
state accept ing the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the 
interpretation of a treaty; b. any qu estion of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if 
established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of the 
reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation '.' 
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Adjudicative bodies with general jurisdiction can also be established under the 
aegis of the PCA. 15 The PCA provides maximum flexibility to the parties and is an 
"administrative organization with the object of having permanent and readily avail -
able means to serve as the registry for the purpose of international arbitration."16 
The PCA provides administrative support and secretarial and registry services for 
many international investment tribunal s, state-state arbitration, and several ad hoc 
bodies. 
Specific Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The great majority of adjudicative bodies have a much more specialized subj ect-
matter jurisdiction, including international criminal law, human rights, interna-
tional trade law, and law of the sea. 
International criminal law 
Three intern ational judicial bodies have specific jurisdiction on certain 
international criminal law violations. The ICC is located in The Hague, 
in The Netherlands, and presently has jurisdiction to prosecute certain 
individuals for three specific international crimes: genocide, crimes agai nst human-
ity, and war crimes. 17 Similarly, two other specialized international tribunals have 
jurisdiction over certain international crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created by the UN Security Council in 1993 to 
prosecute and try individuals on four categories of crimes: grave breaches of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws and customs of war, genocide, 
and crimes against humanity committed in the territory of the fo rmer Yugoslavia.18 
15 On the PCA, see Brooks W. Daly, "Permanent Court of Arbitration ;' in 'Ihe Rules, Practice, and 
jurisprudence of In ternational Courts and Tribunals, ed. Chiara Giorgetti (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 
2012). 
'" Shabtai Rosenne, Th e Hague Peace Conference of1899and1907and In ternationa/Arbitra tion: Reports 
and Documents (The Hague: TM C Asser Press, 2001), xxi. 
17 In general for the ICC, see David Stewart, "The International C riminal Court;' in "I71 e R11les, 
Practice, and Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals, ed. Chiara Giorgetti (Leiden: Martin us 
Nijhoff, 2012). Note that the ju risdiction of the ICC is limited to individuals who are nationals of a state 
party to the ICC Statute, or to crimes that took place in the territory of a state party. Under limited 
circumstances the UN Security Council can refer situations to the ICC. The complementa ry principle 
furth er reduces the scope of the jurisdiction of the ICC. Starting in 2017, the jurisdiction of the ICC 
will also include limited forms of aggression. See also the website of the ICC, which contains all main 
and relevant legal documents as well as information on all of its cases: http://www.i cc-cpi.int/Pages/ 
default.aspx. For an overview of the jurisdiction of the ICC on the crim e of aggression, see M. Politi , 
""lhe ICC and the Crime of Aggression: A Dream that Came through and the Reality Ahead;' Journ al 
of International Criminal justice 10 (2012): 267, as well as the website of the ICC. 
' ~ See, generally, Santiago Villalpando, "The International Criminal 'fribun als for the form er 
Yugoslavia;' in Th e Rules, Practice, and Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals, ed. Chiar a 
Giorgetti (Leiden: Marti nus Nijhoff, 2012). The website of the ICTY is a great resource for all primary 
legal documents: http://www.icty.org/sid/319. 
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Finally, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was created in 1994 to 
prosecute all alleged perpetrators of genocide and other serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and of Rwandan citizens 
responsible for the same acts also in the territory of neighboring states between January 
1, 1994 and December 31, 1994.19 
Human rights 
A number of regional courts also have specialized subject matter jurisdiction 
over allegations of human rights violations brought by individuals against a state. 
The ECtHR, for example, can hear cases brought by individuals related to alleged 
violations of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) by one of the member states.20 All forty-seven 
members of the Council of Europe have ratified the ECHR, extending its protec-
tions to about 800 million people who live in Europe. The jurisdiction of the ECtHR 
includes violations of the right to li fe; the right to a fair hearing; the right to respect 
for private life and family; freedoms of expression, thought, conscience, and reli -
gion; and the protection of property. 21 
Similarly, the Inter-A merican Court of Human Rights has specialized jurisdic-
tion over the interpretation and applicat ion of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, whi ch grants individuals certain basic human rights.22 The Court has heard 
cases concerning forced disappearances, the death penalty, armed conflict, judicial 
independence, amnesty laws, and freedom of expression. 
International administrative tribunals 
A group of increasingly relevant tribunals are competent to hear cases brought 
by the employees of international organizations against their employers on issues 
related to their employment with the organization.23 Such tribunals are important 
because international organizations generally enjoy immunity from suit or legal 
process, and employees would not therefore be able to sue their employer in 
domestic courts. Moreover, the creation of specialized administrative tribunals also 
'" On the TC rH., see Robert D. Sloane, '"l he International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda;' in 
'/he Ru les, Practice, and jurisprudence of International Courts and 'fribunal s, ed. Chi ara Giorgetti 
(Leiden: Marti nus Nijhoff, 2012) . 
''' See Christiane Bourloyannis-Vrai las, "1 he European Court of Human Rights;' in The Rules, 
Practice, and Jurisprudence of Int ernational Cou rts and Tribunals, ed. Chiara Giorgetti (Leiden: Marti nus 
Nij hoff, 2012). 
21 See website of the ECtH ll: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home. 
22 See Christina M. Cerna, "' the Inter-American Comn1ission on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights;' in 'Jh e Rules, Practice, and Jurisprudence of International Court s 
and 'frilnmuls, ed. Chiara Giorgelti (Leiden: Marti nus Nijhoff, 2012). 
23 See O lufem i Elias and Melissa ' lhomas, "Administrative Tribunals ofl nternat ional Organizations;' 
in 'The Rules, Practice, and jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals, ed . Chiara Giorgetti 
(Leiden: Mart inus Nijhoff, 2012) . 
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allows a certain degree of uniformity in the application of employment contracts 
common to staff members from many different domestic jurisdictions. Because 
of the specialized nature of these tribunals, the peculiarity of their procedure, the 
increasingly relevant case law, and the Jack of alternative forums, international 
administrative tribunals constitute an important group of judicial bodies . Most 
international organizations include such tribunals. Main examples include: the DN 
Dispute Tribunal, the UN Appeals Tribunal, the Administrative Tribunals of the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the African Development Bank, and the International Labour Organization 
Administrative Tribunal, which also acts as a tribunal for fifty-eight other interna-
tional organizations.2·1 
Other judicial bodies of specialized jurisdiction 
Other bodies enjoying specialized subject matter jurisdiction include ITLOS, which 
has jurisdiction on Jaw of the sea issues arising out of the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UN CLOS), and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) which is competent to hear appeals from decisions of panels concerning 
violations of the WTO agreements.25 
Territorial Scope: Global v. Regional Bodies 
Another useful way to group adjudicative bodies is to distinguish between global 
and regional bodies. The ICJ, WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and ITLOS are 
all examples of global bodies. Their jurisdiction is not regionally based or regionally 
restricted. 
Conversely, regional bodies cover disputes in specific and limited geographic 
areas. Human rights judicial bodies are typically regionally based. The jurisdic-
tion of the ECtHR is limited to matters "concerning the interpretation and appli-
cation" of the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols, which is 
only open to ratification by members of the Council of Europe and to access ion 
by the European Union. 26 The jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights is likewise limited to member states of the Organization of 
American States. 
24 Including the World Health Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, th e 
World Trade Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, see El ias and Thomas, 
'/\dministrative Tribunals:' 
25 See Gregory). Spak and Gisele Kapterian, "The World Trade Organization;' in Th e Rules, Pm ct ice, 
and Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals, ed. Chiara Giorget ti (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2012). 
26 Art. 32(1) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
November 4, i950, 213 UNTS 222. 
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Similarly, several specialized judicial bodies hear disputes pertaining to regional 
economic and political integration agreements. For example, the European Court of 
Justice is competent to hear cases related to the implementation of European Union 
treaties, whose members are European states. Other judicial bodies of regional 
economic integration agreements include the Court of Justice of the Andean 
Community, whi ch is the dispute resolution body of the Andean Community; the 
Permanent Review Tribunal of the Southern Com mon Market, established by the 
governments of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay; and the Court of Justice 
of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, which includes nineteen 
African countries.27 
The restriction of territorial scope can also result from the specialized jurisdiction 
of particular judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. For example, the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the ICT Y is limited to the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The ICTR can 
only prosecute individuals responsible for genocide and other serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda in i994, and 
Rwandan citizens responsible fo r the same crimes committed in the territory of 
neighboring states in the same period. 
Temporal Scope: Prospective v. Retrospective Bodies 
Internation al adjudicat ive bodies can be also usefully categorized by the temporal 
scope of their jurisdiction. Certain adjudicative bodies enjoy general prospective 
jurisdiction, so that they on ly hear disputes that arose after they were created. These 
include the ICJ, ITLOS, ICC, ECtHR, and administrative tribunals of international 
organizations. 
Conversely, the jurisdiction of other bodies is limited and retrospective, so that 
it applies to events that took place prior to the creation of the body. Retrospective 
jurisdiction is common to the ICTR, ICTY, the UNCC, and the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal.28 
The instrument creating the speci fi c adjudicative body generally provides for the 
temporal scope. Of note, the i993 Security Council resolution creating the ICTY 
provided that it had jurisdiction for crimes committed "since i991" leaving the end 
date for the tribunal to determine.29 
2
·
1 Jenn ife r Thornton, "Cour t and Tribunals of Regional Economic lntegration Agreements:· in 
"lhe Rules, Practice, and Ju risprudence of Int ernational Courts and Tribunals. ed. Chiara Giorgetti 
(Leiden: Mart i nus Nijhoff, 2012). 
28 See David Caron, "Towards a Political 1 heory of International Courts and Tribunals;· Berkeley 
journal of International Law 24 (2006): 4oi. 
" UNSC Res. 808 of February 22, i993. See also Updated Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribuna l for the forrner Yugoslavia, Arts. l (Competence of the International Tribunal) and 8 
(Terri torial and temporal jurisdicti on) : http://www.icty.org. 
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Creation and Structural Arrangements 
The diversity of international adjudicative bodies is also reflected in their varied 
designs and structural arrangements. This is exemplified by the different ways in 
which these bodies are created and by the place they occupy within the interna-
tional legal system. 
How Are Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies Created? 
Adjudicative bodies can be created in a variety of different ways: by a specific inter-
national treaty, through the instrument that created their parent international 
organization, by resolution of the UN Security Council , or by the parties to the 
dispute themselves. 
Only a few international adjudicative bodies have been purposely created by a 
specifi c treaty, after extensive negotiations between the parties. For example, the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is a treaty that created the ICC. 
The Statute is the result of years of intense negotiations, and was adopted at a diplo -
matic conference held in Rome in i998 and entered into force in July 2002.30 
More often, the establishment of such bodies is provided for in the instrument 
that created the international organization withi n wh ich the body exercise its 
functions. So, fo r example, as mentioned above, the ICJ was established by the UN 
Charter, the instrument that created the UN. 31 Similarly, the creation of ITLOS is 
included in UNCLOS.32 Other international treati es that create international organ-
izations and that establish one or more adjudicative bodies include the WTO, whi h 
created a dispute settlement system and the WTO Appellate Body, and the ECHR, 
which established the ECtHR. Treaties that created the European Union also estab -
lished a system of courts to monitor the implementation of their obligations. 
Often the parties themselves create ad hoc adjudicative bodies, fo llowing applicable 
international obligations and rules of procedure. This is the case of international 
arbitra l tribunals constituted under the ICSID Convention, for example, and arbitral 
tribunals constituted under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Rarely, high-profi le adjudicative bodies can be created by UN Security Council 
resolutions. For example, both the ICTY and ICTR were created by reso lutions of 
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Some adjudicative bodies are created by unique means. Among the most peculiar 
are the Iran- US Claims Tribunal and the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims and Boundar ies 
Commissions. The establishment of the Iran- US Claims Tribunal was incorporated 
'
0 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN, 2187 UNTS 3: http :/ !trea ti es. un. org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIJl -10&chapter=18&lang=en . 
" The text of the UN Charter is available at the website of the UN: http://www.un.org/en /. 
32 See JTJ.OS website: http://www. itlos.org/index.php?id =2&L=o. 
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in a i981 Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning 
the Settlement of Disputes, to which Iran and the US formally adhered. Algeria 
acted as a broker and mediator between the United States and Iran, who were at 
the time unwilling to negotiate directly. 33 The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary and 
Claims Commissions were created and operated as independent bodies pursuant to 
Articles 4 ands of the Agreement between the Governments of the State of Eritrea 
and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, signed in Algiers on December 
i2, 2000 and which also included several other commitments related to the cessa-
tion of hostilities between the two countries.3·1 
The Place of Adjudicative Bodies in the International Community 
International adjudicative bodies occupy diverse places with in the international 
community and other international legal actors. Essentially, they can either stand 
alone, as a distinct international actor, or can be embedded in an international 
organization with broader functions. 
Stand-Alone Bodies 
Some judicial or quasi-judicial bodies stand alone. Though they may engage in rela-
tionships with other members of the international community, they do not depend 
on or report to them, and are not functionally or financially attached to any other 
international organization. This is the case of the ICC, which is an independent 
organization . 111e Assembly of State Parties, composed of the states that have rat-
ified or acceded to the Rome Statute, is the Court's management, oversight, and 
legislative body. Uniquely, the UN Security Council can refer specific situations of 
concern to the Prosecutor for possible actions. This special relation is provided in 
the ICC Statute and does not derive from a dependent relation with the UN.35 
Another important example of a stand-alone judicial body is the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, which was created by the parties with a specific mandate to hear cases 
between them. 
Ad hoc arbitration tribunals are also often independent bodies that act separately 
from other international organizations, though they may be assisted by them. 
The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary and Claims Commissions are examples of these 
n "Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of 
Disputes of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Islamic Repub li c ofiran, January 19, 1981;' 20 ILM 223 (1981). 
J4 "Agreement between the Governments of the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, signed in Algiers on December 12, 2000": http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage. 
asp?pag_id =11 51. 
35 See ICC, "About the Court;' http://www.icc-cpi.int. The ICC Statute specifies that the Court "shall 
have internati onal legal personality" (Art. 4) . Art icle 2 provides that '"n1e Court shall be brought into 
relationship with the United Nations through an agreement to be approved by the Assembly of the 
States Parties to this Statute and thereafte r concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf' 
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arrangements, as they were created as independent bodies, though the PCA pro -
vided secretarial and other administrative support. 
Part of an International Organization 
More often, adjudicative bodies are part of an international organization and func-
tion within it. In these instances, the dispute resolution function can be directed to 
either external or internal matters. 
Certain bodies are organs of the international organization. The ICJ, as provided 
in Article 7 of the UN Charter, is a principal organ of the UN, while both the ICTY 
and ICTR are subsidiary organs of the Security Council. 36 Importantly, these bo dies 
maintain significant links to the organization to which they are parties, including 
on issues of funding and personnel. 
The dispute resolution system of the WTO is peculiar as it contains elem ents of 
both categories. It comprises two bodies. At first, disputes between WTO member 
states are submitted to a DSB panel, whose expert members are selec ted in consul -
tation with the parties to the dispute. The Appellate Body, conversely, is a standing 
organ composed of seven members who sit in three-person panels, and that can 
hear appeals on legal issues covered in the report of the ad hoc panel.37 
Another group of adjudicative bodies provides internal justice. Administrative 
tribunals of international organizations are standing o rgans, composed of perma-
nent judges who can only hear cases related to personnel issues. They provide justice 
on matters that are internal and proper to the specific international organization. 
WHAT Do INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATIVE BODIES Do? 
The primary function of international adjudicative bodies is to provide a final and 
legally binding outcome to specific international disputes brought to them by eli -
gible parties. Naturally, the scope of the disputes depends on the jurisd ic tion of the 
specific body, and thus differs substantially from body to body. 
-"' Art. 7, UN Charter-stating " i. There are established as the principal organs of the United 
Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, and Economic and Social Counsel, a Tru steesh ip 
Council, and International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat. 2. Such subsidiary organs as m ay be 
found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter~' 
37 See Romano, "A Taxonomy off nternational Rule of Law Institutions;· i8. 
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Overall, international law disputes often concern alleged violations of interna-
tional obligations and the interpretation of general or specific treaties applicable to 
the parties. These can include human rights conventions, international criminal law 
treaties, general instruments like the UN Charter, or international customary law 
and general principles of law. It may also include the interpretation of other inter-
national instruments in force between the parties, including contract terms in case 
of investment arbitration, or labor law for administrative tribunals. 
As provided by Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, in taking its decisions, the ICJ applies: 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly rec-
ognized by the contesting States; international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and ... judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.38 
Other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies often refer to this provision and take it into 
consideration in their decisions, together with other applicable sources oflaw. 
Procedures and competence are specific to each judicial and quasi -judicial body 
and require a focused analysis.39 Several common issues, however, can be usefully 
considered. 
Proceedings 
By and large, proceedings include a written and oral phase. Written pleadings can 
either be simultaneously exchanged or can be sequential. There is always an oppor-
tunity to reply. At the ICJ, for example, the written phase includes a Memorial sub-
mitted by the applicant, a Counter-Memorial submitted by respondent, generally 
followed by a Reply by the appl icant and a Rejoinder by the respondent.40 Parties 
submit substantial evidence to support their cases, including primary and contem-
porary documents, historical records, and expert and legal opinions. The initial 
written phase can take quite a long time, often a couple of years, especially if the 
respondent challenges the tribunal's jurisdiction and the proceedings are bifurcated 
38 Art. 38 of the IC} Statute. 
3
' For a focused and comprehensive analysis of several of these bodies, see Ruth Mackenzie et al. , 
Manual on lnlernalional Courts and Tribunals, 211d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Giorgetti (ed.), 'fhe Rules, Practice, and jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals; and "The 
Project on International Courts and Tribunals;' http://www.pict-pcti.org. 
''° Art. 45 of the Rules of the Court provides that "the pleadings in a case begun by means of an appli-
cation sha ll consist, in the foll owing order, of: a Memorial by the applicant; a Counter-Memorial by the 
respondent:' And that "the Court may authorize or direct that there shall be a Reply by the applicant 
and a Rejoinder by the respondent if the parties are so agreed, or if the Court decides, proprio motu 
or at the request of one of the parties, that these pleadings are necessary": Rules of ·n1e Court (1978), 
http://www. i cj-ci j. org/ do cu men ts/ index. p hp ?p1 =4&p2=3&p3=0. 
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between the jurisdictional and merits phases. Oral proceedings fo llow the written 
exchanges and provide an opportunity for parties to plead their case directly in 
front of the decision-makers and answer any questions they may have. Depending 
on the tribunal, during the hearings experts and witnesses may be heard and exam-
ined. Hearings are rarely confrontational, though. They are often condensed to a 
few full days or weeks and require intense preparation by all involved. 
Issuing Judgments and Orders 
International adjudicative bodies can issue a variety of decisions. 
Orders are interlocutory deci sions taken to administer proceedings, including 
procedural calendars or the collection of evidence. Orders can also be issued in 
response to a request for preliminary (or interim) measures of protection to pre-
serve the respective rights of the parties.41 In the LaGrand case, the ICJ confirmed 
that preliminary measures have a binding effect on the parties to the case and must 
be applied.12 
If the proceedings are bifurcated, the court or tribunal first decides on whether it 
has jurisdiction to decide the case, and decides then on the merits of the case. Final 
judgment must include the reasons for the decision. 
Deliberations are secret and decisions are taken by a majority of judges, with a 
casting vote of the President when necessary. Dissenting and separate opinions are 
often appended to the final decisions.'13 
Limited Appeals 
International judicial proceedings do not normally include the possibility of appeal. 
However, there are some exceptions. Decisions by the trial chambers of interna-
tional criminal bodies, for example, can be appealed by both the defendant and the 
prosecutor to the Appeal Chamber. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR can hear 
cases referred to it by one of the parties within three months of the decision of a 
·
11 e.g., see Art. 41 of the !CJ Statute. 
12 LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) Provisional Measures, O rders of March 3, i999, 
!CJ Reports 1999, 9 . 
.u See Art. 55 of the !CJ Statute. On dissenting opinions in inte rnational investment arbitration, 
see Alan Redfern, "Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: Th e Good, the Bad 
and the Ugly;' Arbitration International 20 (2004): 223; and A. ). van den Berg, "Dissenting Opinions 
by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration;' in Looking to the Future: Essays on 
International Law in Honor of W Michael neisman, ed. Mahnoush 1--T. Arsanjani et al. (Leiden, Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) . 
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chamber, if it decides that the case raises a "serious question" of general importance 
or of interpretation or application of the ECHR.'14 The Appellate Body of the WTO 
can hear appeals on legal issues covered in th e report of the experts' paneI.-15 
Proceedings may also include other fo rms of post-judgment remedies. At the 
ICJ, fo r example, parties may apply fo r interpretation or revision of the judgment 
if decisive new facts are discovered .16 The ICSID Convention provides fo r limited 
review of a decision in special annulment proceedings based on limited grounds 
enumerated in the ICSID Convention itself. 17 
Remedies and Reparations 
When an international adjudicative body finds that there has been a violation 
of in ternational law, it can issue a judgment, award, or decision ordering differ-
ent types of reparation. Article 34 of the International Law Commission's Draft 
Articles on State Responsibili ty provides that reparation for the injury caused by 
an internationally wrongful act can take the fo rm of "resti tution, compensation 
and satisfaction:' 18 Full restitution (restitutio ad integrum) is the preferred method 
in international proceedings, but often re-establishing the situation which existed 
before the wrongful act was committed is either materially impossible or excessively 
burdensome on the parties. In such cases, monetary compensation for the damage 
caused is often used as a fo rm of reparation in proceedings between states, arbitra-
tion tribunals, and many judic ial and quasi-judicial bodies. 
In addition to compensation for dam ages and resti tution, human rights tribu-
nals can also request that states which have violated the convention prevent similar 
violations in the future. This will require the state to adopt the necessary individual 
or general measures, including amendment of domestic legislation. In the Barrios 
Altos case, fo r example, in addition to requiring the payment of compensation, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights requi red Peru to grant families of the vic-
tims free health care and educational support; repeal two amnesty laws; establish 
the crime of extrajudicial killing domestically; ratify a relevant international con-
vention; publish the judgment in the national media; publicly apologize and under-
take to prevent similar events in the future; and erect a memori al monument to the 
victims.19 
•
11 Art. 43 of the ECH R. 
·
15 See Romano, "A Taxonomy of l nternat ional Rul e of Law Insti tutions;' 18. 
•
10 Arts. 61 and 62 of the JC) Statute. 17 Art. 52 of the ICSID Convention. 
·•• Art. 34, Responsibili ty of States fo r Internationally Wrongful Acts, General Assembly (GA) 
Res. 56/83 of December 12, 200 1, UN Doc. A/56/49 . 
. ., 13u.rrios Altos Case, Jud gment of November 30, 2001, Inte r-Am Ct HR (Ser. C) No. 87 (2001), 
http ://www1 .um n.edu /hu man rts/iach r/C/87-ing. html. 
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International criminal tribunals are of course very different in this resp re 
Individuals who are found guilty of violations of international criminal l a~ a al 
· . . . . at1ofl given pnson terms that can go up to hfe imprisonment. Because 111tern . . ·es 
. . 1 "b 1 1 k · · · fac1ht1 cnmma tn una s ac a pnson system, pnson sentences are carried out in 
situated in member states. 
Enforcement and Implementation Mechanisms 
Compliance with international decisions relies substantially on general respec~ fo : 
international law, peer pressure, and possible political or financial reperc~ssio~­
for non -compliance. Despite skepticism, the great majority of decisions are i.rnP be 
mented and enforced voluntarily by the parties, who have generally agreed to 
bound by the adjudicative body's decision. . 1 to When compliance does not come voluntarily, however, it may be d1fficu t f 
compel. Indeed, the lack of effective enforcement procedures is probably one 
0 f 
the weakest points of the adjudicative system . For example, under Article 94
1
° 
. . ft 1e 
the UN Charter, member states undertake to comply with the dec1 s10~s 0 " h e 
ICJ in cases in which they are party. If a party fail s to perform its obligat10ns t 
other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it d ee'.11
5 
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon m easures to be taken to give 
effect to the judgmenf'50 The Security Council was only going to be asked once, 
. d .. n was by Nicaragua, to make a recommendation in thi s respect, but the ec1sio 
vetoed by the United States, a permanent member, against which the ICJ judg-
ment had been given in absentia. 51 
Some bodies have established stricter and more efficient enforcement proceed-
ings. For example, judgments of the ECtHR finding violations are transmitted to 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for execution . The judgment 
then remains on the agenda of the Committee until it is satisfied that it has been 
properly enforced. In several ad hoc proceedings, including those of the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal and the UNCC, the parties provided for spec ial mechanism s to 
enforce payment of compensation. Awards issued under the ICSID Convention are 
enforceable in the territory of all contracting states as if they were final judgment of 
a court in that state.52 
; o Art. 94 of the UN Charter. 
; i See UNSC Doc. S-18428 on October 28, 1986: http://www.un.org/depts/dhl / resguide/scact_veto_ 
en .shtml. 
" Art. 54 of the ICSID Convention. 
l 
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Advisory Opinions 
In addition to their adjudicative funct ion, some judicial bodies can also give advisory 
opinions on certain legal questions. For example, the ICJ can issue advisory opin -
ions on legal questions at the request of the organs of the UN or specialized agencies 
authorized to make such a request. ITLOS, ECtHR, and the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights can also render nonbinding advisory opinions, when requested 
by authorized actors.53 
How Do JuDICIAL 
AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES WORK? 
Structure of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies 
The essential constitutive components of international adjudicative bodies are simi-
lar and include a number of decisions- makers; a secretariat, who acts as a support 
structure that enables the body to function; and, often an assembly body compris-
in g member states. 
Who Are the Decision-M akers? 
At the center of all adjudicat ive bodies are the decision -makers, who can be given a 
variety of titles, including judges, arbitrators, members, and commissioners. They 
are responsible fo r the final decis ion and resolution of a dispute. Decisions-makers 
in in ternational adjudicative bodies are often called to decide complex and sensitive 
issues and are highly regarded and respected individuals, often at the pinnacle of 
their legal careers. 
Importantly, they all sit in their personal capacity and independently from 
any government, appointing authori ty, or domestic court. The Statute of ITLOS, 
fo r example, requi res all judges to be "independent members" of the Tribunal.54 
Similarly, the ICSID Convention requires that all arbitrators "may be relied upon to 
exercise independent judgment:'55 
53 See Art. 138 of the TTLOS Rul e~. Art. 47 of the ECH R, and Art. 64 of the American Human Rights 
Convention. 
54 Art. 2 of the Statute of !Tl.OS, http://www.itlos.org. 
53 Art. t4 of th e ICSID Convention, https://icsid .worldbank.org/ICS!D/lndex.jsp. 
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The composition of these collective bodies varies. The ICJ, for example, has fifteen 
members,56 while ITLOS has twenty-one members.57 Uniquely, the ECtHR is com-
posed of the same numbers of judges as there are state parties to the ECHR, pres-
ently forty-seven.58 Membership is often restricted by nationality and geographical 
distribution, so that, in the case of the ICJ for example, "no two [members] may be 
nationals of the same State:'59 Additionally, a fa ir representation of "the main form s 
of civilizations and of the principle legal systems of the world" is often required in 
international bodies.60 
There are three overall mechanisms to select international judges, arbitrators, or 
commissioners: by election, by a neutral authority, or by the parties to the dispute. 
First, judges in international courts are nominated, often by a national nominat-
ing committee, and then elected by a decision-making body of an international 
organization, for example the General Assembly and the Security Council of the 
UN. Judges of the ECtHR are elected by majority of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe from lists of three candidates proposed by each state party. 
Because of the prestige and status of international decisions-makers, especially 
within the UN system, elections are complex and important, and states can spend 
significant resources to get their candidates elected.61 The election of judges takes 
place in all international courts and tribunals, including ITLOS, ICC, ICTY, ICTR, 
ECtHR. Judges are elected for a specific amount of time. For example, judges at the 
ICJ and ITLOS are elected for nine years and can be re-elected. Judges at the ECtHR 
serve for one non-renewable term of nine years. Elections are typically staggered, so 
that a small number of judges are elected every three years or so, so as to allow both 
renewal and consistency. 
Second, arbitrators can be selected by a neutral third party under certain cir-
cumstances, including inaction by one of the disputing parties, the selection of 
the president of the tribunal, and the selection of members of ad hoc committees. 
A neutral appointing authority can also be tasked with the selection of specific 
arbitrators. 
Third, and finally, in most international arbitrations, the parties themselves can 
select their own arbitrators, as it happens in ICSID and NAFTA proceedings. Parties 
can also select ad hoc judges at the ICJ in certain circumstances.62 
'" Art. 2 of the !CJ Statute. 57 Art. 2 of the Statute of !TLOS, http://www.itlos.org. 
58 Art. 21 of the ECHR, http://www.echr.coe. int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
5
' Art. 3 of the !CJ Statute. 
"
0 See Art. 9 of the ICJ Statute and Art. 2 of the ITLOS Statute. 
0 1 Ruth Mackenzie et al. , Selecting International Judges: Principles, Process and Politics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) . 
0
' Claudia T. Salomon, "Selecting an International Arbitrator: Five Factors to Consider;' Maeleys 
lnternational Arbitration Report 17 (October 2002): 10; Constantine Partasides, "The Selec tion, 
Appointment and Challenge of Arbitrators;' Vindobona Journal 5 (200 1): 217. 
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In some cases two methods are used to select the final members of the arbitral 
tribunal. International investment tribunals, for example, are generally composed 
of three members. Commonly, two of the three arbitrators are unilaterally selected 
by the parties, with each party appointing one arbitrator. The third arbitrator and 
presiding arbitrator is selected by agreement of the party, or, more often, by an 
appointing authority. 63 
In addition to providing a framework that specifies how to select judges and arbi-
trators, applicable rules of procedure also require judges and arbitrators to possess 
certain legal qualifications and competences, which are often quite general. Judges 
of the ICJ, for example are "elected regardless of their nationality, from among per-
sons of high moral characte r, which possess the qualifications required in their 
respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris-
consults of recognized competences in international law:'61 Judges of the ECtHR 
must be "of high moral characte r" and "either possess the qualifications required 
fo r appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsultants of recognized compe-
tence:'65 Under the I CS ID Conventi on, arbitrators must be persons of "recognized 
competence" in the fields of law in particular, and commerce industry or finance. 66 
More recently, newly constituted courts and tribunals have added more detailed 
requi rements. For example, the ICC Statute requi res judges to have expertise in 
criminal law and procedure or, alternatively, to have expertise in international 
humanitarian law and human rights law.67 ITLOS's judges are elected from among 
persons "enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity and of recog-
nized competence in the field of the Jaw of the sea:'68 
The elections and nominations of international judges and arbitrators have at 
times been criticized for Jack of diversity, and especially for the paucity of women 
judges and arbitrators. Uniquely, the ICC Statute has tried to address this issue by 
requiring a fa ir representation of female and male judges in its Court.69 
Secretariats and Registries 
Secretariats and registries provide essential, albeit often underestimated, sup-
port to the work of internati onal adjudicative bodies. In addition to adminis-
trative support, they also register, service, and keep track of all cases, deal with 
requests from the parti es, and manage financial issues. For example, the tasks of 
03 Art. 37 of the lCSID Convention. "" Art. 2 of the ICJ Statute. 
65 Art. 21 of the ECHR Statute. 
60 Art. 14(1) of the ICSID Convention. In general, see Karel Daele, Challenges and Disqualification c~{ 
Arbitrators in International Arbitration (Leiden: Kluwer Law International, 2011 ), 84. 
"
7 Art. 36 of the ICC Statute, A/CONF.183/9, adopted on Ju ly 17, 1998 and entered into force July 1, 
2002 (requiring geographical distribution and representation of the principle legal systems of the 
world , as well as a fair representation of femal e and male judges). 
6
" Art. 2 of the Statute oflTLOS, http: //www. itlos.org. "9 Art. 36 of the ICC Statute. 
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the Registrar of the ICJ "are not only those of a service helping in the administra -
tion of justice-with sovereign States as litigants-but also those of a secretariat 
of an international commission. Its activities are both judicial and diplomatic, as 
well as administrative:'70 
In certain instances, mainly in arbitration, the services of the secretariats can be 
flexible. The Secretariat of the PCA, the International Bureau, provides full regis-
try services and legal and administrative support to tribunals and commissions. 
The extent of its services can be agreed upon by the parties.71 Similarly, the ICSID 
Secretariat provides services to ICSID tribunals that are essential for their success 
and functioning. 72 
Assembly Body 
In conjunction with decision-makers and support bodies, the structures of the 
adjudicative bodies often include an assembly body comprising all member states. 
The assembly body provides general management guidance, decides on budget-
ary issues, reviews periodic reports, can often approve rules of procedures, and is 
involved in the selection of decision-makers. For example, the Assembly of State 
Parties of the ICC is composed of representatives of the states that have ratified or 
acceded to the Rome Statute, and decides on items such as "the adoption of norma-
tive texts and of the budget, the election of the judges and of the Prosecutor and 
the Deputy Prosecutor:'73 For the ICJ, and other UN judicial bodies, that function 
is provided by the UN General Assembly. The Administrative Council of the PCA, 
whose membership includes representatives of all 115 member states, oversees its 
policies and budgets.7~ The Administrative Council, composed of one representa-
tive of each of the ICSID Contracting States, is the governing body ofICSID.75 
Who Can Bring a Claim? 
Traditionally, the personal jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals was 
limited to states. States are the main subjects of international law and they have typ -
ically been granted access to the majority of international courts and tribunals. For 
example, the ICJ can only hear cases between states. Other judicial bodies whose 
personal jurisdiction is limited to states include the WTO and ITLOS. 
'
0 ICJ, "The Registry;' http://www.icj-cij.org/registry/index.php?p1=2. 
" PCA, "About Us;' http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1027. 
72 ICSID, "Organizational Structure of ICSID;' https://icsid.worldbank.org. 
" ICC, "Assembly of State Parties;· http://www.i cc-cpi.int. 
74 PCA, "Structure;· http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=t039. 
75 ICSID, "Organizational Structure of!CSID;' https://icsid .worldbank.org. 
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One of the most interesting recent developments in international law is the 
increasing direct access given to individuals and other nonstate actors to numer-
ous international adjudicative bodies. In fact, individuals now have direct access to 
multiple bodies and can directly bring claims related to human rights, international 
investments, and international labor law. Thus, individuals can bring direct claims 
to the ECtHR and natural and juridical persons could also bring claims directly 
at the UNCC, at the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, and in international investment 
arbitrations.76 
The jurisdiction on international criminal tribunal and courts, like the ICC, ICTY, 
and ICTR is based on individual responsibility for conduct defined as criminal 
under international law. These courts mirror domestic criminal courts, and provide 
for a specially elected prosecutor to bring cases against individuals on behalf of the 
international community. 
In international administrative tribunals, claims are brought by staff members 
against the international organization that employs them. 
International adjudicative bodies afford only limited participation to third par-
ties. Amicus briefs are not allowed in most courts, with the exception of some inter-
national investment arbitration bodies. 
CONCLUSION 
TI1e exponential growth of international adjudicative bodies is recent, and has not 
been organic or systematic. Indeed, they are not organized hierarchically and there 
is no structured internationa l judicial system.77 
The unsystematic proliferation of these bodies has generated much discus-
sion among in ternational lawyers. These discussions have focused on possible 
co nsequences of the proliferation of adjudicative bodies for the development 
of international law; the need for formal or informal coordination between 
judicial actors; and whether proliferation as a legal phenomenon is positive or 
whether it would result in excess ive fragmentation of the international judicial 
system. 78 Indeed, the proli fe ration of judicial bodies has led to concerns about 
70 See Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/DocumentsMain.jsp. 
77 See Jonathan I. Charney, '"lhe Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of 
International Courts and Tribunals;' New York University journal of International Law and Policy 31 
(1999) : 697. 
7
" See Benedi ct Kingsbury, "Foreword: ls the Proliferation of lnternatiorntl Courts and Tribunals a 
Systemic Problem?;' New York University journal of lnternationnl Law and Policy 31 (1999): 679. See also 
902 INTERNATIO NAL ADJUDI CATIV E BODIES 
the risk of atomization of international law into separate areas, and about the 
possible weakening of international law by competing decisions of different tri -
bunals deciding on the same or similar legal issues.79 
In reality, time has shown that concerns are mostly unjustified: the jurisdiction of 
these bodies is sufficiently specific to avoid real conflict. Moreover, more complex 
disputes have required a more sophisticated use of the system, whereby different 
aspects of a case are presented in front of different adjudicative bodies. 
Assessing the effectiveness of international adjudicative bodies is also an important 
and complex exercise. On one side, some critics have focused on the fact that, con-
trary to conventional wisdom, the most successful international tribunals are those 
where judges are appointed by parties for the purpose of resolving a particular dis-
pute.Bo On the other side, experts have argued that assessing the effectiveness of 
international adjudicative bodies requires a more complex analysis, which must 
include not only judicial independence, but also the tribunal's composition, the 
caseload and functional capacity, the quality of legal reasoning and independent 
fact-finding capabilities, and the nature of the violations.BI 
Assessing the effectiveness of international adjudicative bodies necessarily 
includes many different variables and is perforce dependent on these variables. 
Issues to consider include compliance with the decision by the parties, usage rates, 
impact on state conduct, impact on the parties and other stakeholders, the com-
plexity of the issues decided, existing case law and the decision's relationship with 
it, available remedies, and the sophistication of the legal reasoning. Moreover, states 
have many different reasons to create adjudicative bodies, from addressing press-
ing legal violations (ICTR and ICTY), to concluding long negotiations (ICC), to 
the aftermath of unique political processes, like the end of the Cold War-which 
in many ways changed the international legal landscape.B2 All these issues must be 
taken into consideration when assessing the effectiveness and usefulness of interna-
tional adjudicative bodies. 
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